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Tying Central African Peace to US Energy Security and Critical Minerals

Jiho Lee
Aug 23
4 min read

How a regional peace agreement bolsters major U.S. supply chains for batteries, grids, and clean energy technologies


In December 2025, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda confirmed and began implementing a U.S.-brokered peace agreement intended to reduce armed conflict in eastern Congo and stabilize cross-border relations [1]. The agreement, referred to as the DRC–Rwanda Washington Accords for Peace and Prosperity, builds on a preliminary diplomatic agreement reached in June 2025 [2]. While the June agreement focused on security commitments and diplomatic normalization, the December confirmation activated operational elements of the deal, including economic and investment provisions linked to mineral development, infrastructure financing, and foreign commercial participation [7]. 


U.S.–DRC Mineral Cooperation Formalized

At the same time, the United States and the DRC finalized an agreement on critical minerals covering mineral extraction, transport infrastructure, investment approvals, and supply-chain oversight [3]. The agreement explicitly applies to minerals used in battery production, power transmission, and clean energy manufacturing [5].

Under the partnership, U.S.-based firms receive preferential access to selected Congolese mining projects and long-term supply contracts aimed at securing rare earth minerals rather than relying solely on purchasing from international markets [1].


Role of the DRC in Energy Supply Chains

The DRC produces roughly 70 percent of global cobalt output and is also a major copper supplier [8]. These materials are critical for lithium-ion batteries, power grids, electric motors, renewable energy systems, and electric vehicle charging infrastructure [5].

Under current forecasts, global cobalt demand is expected to rise sharply by the mid-2030s, while copper demand linked to grid expansion and electrification is projected to increase by more than 40 percent [6].


Processing Concentration and Supply Risk

Despite high output, the DRC has limited domestic mineral processing capacity [7]. China refines approximately 75–80 percent of global cobalt and holds ownership stakes across multiple Congolese mining operations [6].

For U.S. energy and manufacturing sectors, this concentration increases exposure to supply disruptions and geopolitical conflict, especially given China’s increasing stake in the mining operations [9]. As of 2025, the United States imports the majority of its cobalt requirements, more than half of its lithium, and a substantial share of refined copper [8].


Political and Strategic Concerns

Some analysts argue that U.S. involvement in the DRC–Rwanda peace process reflects a conflict of interest over mineral access alongside security objectives [10]. The Congolese government has increasingly framed mineral partnerships as leverage in broader U.S.–China competition [2]. Critics warn that tying peace efforts to access to natural resources could keep countries dependent on extraction, without fixing weak governance or building a more diverse, long-term economy [10].


Infrastructure and Power Constraints

Expanded mineral production in the DRC depends on reliable electricity supply, transport corridors, and export infrastructure [7]. Mining operations face persistent power shortages, and policy discussions linked to the partnership have referenced grid expansion and hydropower development as enabling investments [3].

Investment decisions remain sensitive to commodity price cycles, with recent cobalt price declines highlighting demand uncertainty in energy-transition supply chains [6].


Outlook

For the United States, cobalt and copper are directly tied to domestic energy deployment and energy security [9]. Lithium-ion batteries account for more than 90 percent of new grid-scale energy storage installations, while copper intensity in transmission lines and electric vehicles is several times higher than in fossil-based energy systems [5]. Given China’s historic dominance over the consumption of these minerals, the United States has begun implementing their own approach to address this economic threat.The December confirmation demonstrates how mineral supply considerations are being integrated into diplomatic and security arrangements [1]. Whether this approach produces mutually beneficial outcomes will depend on security conditions, infrastructure delivery, and whether mineral development supports long-term local economic stability rather than short-term extraction purposes [10].


Bibliography


[1]B. Okoth, “Trump says US to access DRC, Rwanda ‘rare earth minerals’ as two nations sign peace deal,” TRT Afrika, Dec. 04, 2025. https://www.trtafrika.com/english/article/652f452b2fa5? (accessed Dec. 23, 2025).

[2]S. Njenga, “Peace For Minerals: Future Prospects of DRC-Rwanda Washington Accords  - Mashariki Research and Policy Centre,” Mashariki Research and Policy Centre, Dec. 22, 2025. https://masharikirpc.org/peace-for-minerals-future-prospects-of-drc-rwanda-washington-accords/ (accessed Dec. 23, 2025).

[3]“Strategic Partnership Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo - United States Department of State,” United States Department of State, 2025. https://www.state.gov/strategic-partnership-agreement-between-the-government-of-the-united-states-of-america-and-the-government-of-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo (accessed Dec. 23, 2025).

[4]Critical Minerals – Topics - IEA, “Critical Minerals – Topics - IEA,” IEA, 2025. https://www.iea.org/topics/critical-minerals? (accessed Dec. 23, 2025).

[5]IEA, “The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions – Analysis,” IEA, May 2021. https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-transitions (accessed Dec. 23, 2025).

[6]International Energy Agency, “Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2024 – Analysis,” IEA, May 17, 2024. https://www.iea.org/reports/global-critical-minerals-outlook-2024 (accessed Dec. 23, 2025).

[7]Ecofin Agency, “Washington’s New Strategic Play in Central Africa Reshapes Control of Critical Minerals,” Ecofin Agency, Dec. 09, 2025. https://www.ecofinagency.com/news/0912-51232-washingtons-new-strategic-play-in-central-africa-reshapes-control-of-critical-minerals? (accessed Dec. 23, 2025).

[8]USGS, “MINERAL COMMODITY SUMMARIES 2025,” Jan. 2025. Accessed: Dec. 23, 2025. [Online]. Available: https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2025/mcs2025.pdf

[9]International Energy Agency, “Energy Security,” IEA, 2023. https://www.iea.org/topics/energy-security (accessed Dec. 23, 2025).

[10]“Can the DRC Leverage U.S.-China Competition Over Critical Minerals for Peace?,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2025. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/03/can-the-drc-leverage-us-china-competition-over-critical-minerals? (accessed Dec. 23, 2025).




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