Is objectivity all in the mind?

Imagine a jury instructed to look at a flickering courtroom monitor, watching grainy CCTV footage of a shop store front at midnight. Half of the jury is convinced that they saw the defendant's hand slip around a knife's hilt; whilst the other half insists it is nothing but a mere shadow cast by a passing car. This then begs the question are they witnessing two different ‘facts,’ or are their intellects abstracting distinct interpretations of the one real event? 

In other words, is objectivity merely a projection of our mental faculties, or does genuine knowledge of a mind - an independent world lie within grasp - and indeed the very possibility of justice would hang perilously not based on the truth of the thing in of itself but on the perspective exterior to the event. This essay argues that Thomistic realism offers the most philosophically coherent account of objectivity. This view posits that the human intellect is truly capable of knowing reality as it is, because, as espoused by Thomists, being is inherently intelligible. According to the angelic doctor (St Thomas Aquinas) the mind does not impose order on a chaotic world; instead, it receives form from things as they are, and in doing so, attains a true conformity with them. In fact St Thomas Aquinas defines truth as “adequatio intellectus et rei” - the conformity of the intellect with reality. 

The thesis commences by tracing the historical development of epistemological ideas from Platonic realism, the Kantian turn and into contemporary scepticism. This essay will explain the Thomistic account of how the mind knows, focusing on the materiality of the intellect, the process of abstraction, and the metaphysical foundation of intelligibility. Consequently, objections from modern philosophy will be considered - either particularly or specifically those concerning perception, relativism, and the limits of language - and vindicate the thomistic paradigms addresses of these concerns without collapsing into idealism or fideism. 

Historical context 

To Plato the world of sense was merely weak imitation. Instead it existed in the World of Forms. The objects we see around us are flawed copies of perfect forms (e.g, Beauty, Justice, Triangle). True knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) he contends, cannot be derived from the senses. Why? Because the world around us is constantly changing to reflect imperfect examples of things. In this view, objectivity can exist but only in a world of perfect ideas and can be understood only through the rational soul or intellect. 

Aristotle 

Ironically Aristotle, Plato’s student, disagreed with Plato’s idea on the world of forms. He believed the form (μορφή) and matter (ὕλη) exist together inside things, rejecting the need for some invisible, perfect place. According to Aristotle Knowledge begins with senses but only through abstraction. Objectivity is based on facts but we can only reach true understanding if the mind is properly trained to look beyond mere appearances. 

St Augustine

Augustine, argued from a Christian background. He believed objective truth cannot come from human reason alone but must be revealed by God. God, the source of all truth, has to shine a divine light onto our minds to allow us to understand unchanging truths that exist beyond our experiences. Truth can only show itself when God “illuminates” our minds. 

Thomistic foundation 

Thomistic metaphysical realism is different from the view that truth is nothing but mental construct . Things exist whether we think about them or not, with patterns the intellect is meant to understand . St Thomas articulates this principle through “actus essendi” (‘act of being’): ‘to be is to be intelligible’ meaning if something is real then it can be understood. Just as the eye requires light to see, the mind can only understand when there is something real to understand. According to Aquinas, the things of this world aren’t empty. They “say something” through their shapes or actions. Reality makes knowledge possible. In The Philosophy of Realism, Brian Kemple agrees with Aquinas, arguing meaning is embedded in being. Objectivity isn’t something we invent but the mind reacting to what is already real. 

St Thomas distinguishes essence (nature) and existence (fact of being real). For all creations these differ. A thing’s nature doesn’t mean it’s real. As Aquinas explains in De Ente et Essentia, our minds can know concepts without making them up. 

In Thomistic epistemology, thought isn’t an internalised process with no connect to reality. Frederick D. Wilhelmsen, in Man’s Knowledge of Reality, writes ‘the intellect is ordered to being as its proper object’ (p. 37). This comes from the Thomistic understanding of intentionality: our thoughts are always aimed at something. 

Whether one thinks of a tree or a mythical creature, the mind must move beyond itself. Wilhelmsen says: ‘The act of knowledge is an act toward reality. It is not a self-contained act’ (p. 46). Intentionality proves the mind isn’t isolated but made to encounter what exists. Wilhelmsen explains: ‘For Thomas, man knows because he is immersed in being. He does not fabricate the world; he discovers it’ (p. 63). This ‘light’ is an analogy for the agent intellect (intellectus agens), the part of the mind that pulls understanding from our senses. We don’t impose meaning, we receive it. Knowledge participates in what is real. Objectivity is not ‘all in the mind’. It’s the result of the mind’s interaction with reality. In Thomistic philosophy, the mind must be immaterial because it can understand universal ideas not tied by matter. Edward Feser explains, ‘material processes are always particular, but thought can be universal.’ So if thinking can be universal, it can’t be a physical process. When we think of ‘triangularity’ or ‘justice,’ we’re not thinking of one triangle or one act of justice. We’re touching on the universal nature of these things. The intellect grasps essences which aren’t material. According to St Thomas, this is only possible if the mind receives form but not matter. The brain, being physical, can’t do this, the intellect can. Feser says, ‘the form of the thing must exist in the intellect without its matter’ for real understanding to happen. This is why the intellect isn’t merely part of the body, it's open to universal truths in a way no physical thing can. Feser argues that objectivity is only possible because the intellect is immaterial. ‘If our thoughts were nothing more than brain states,’ he writes, ‘they could never rise above the particular and contingent.’ But the intellect can reach beyond it understands truths like maths or ethics. The mind doesn’t invent objectivity it receives it. It’s built to know being just as it is.

Stances and objections 

There are different schools that challenge the idea that objectivity comes from reality itself. I will be tackling 3 objections from three different schools: idealism, Phenomenalism and Social Constructivism. 

The first is Kant’s transcendental idealism, which claims that while reality exists, we don’t know things as they truly are (noumena). He claims our minds have built-in ‘categories’ such as space and time that shape our experiences. 

Secondly, Phenomenalism represents objectivity as physical objects not existing independently of perception. According to this view, a chair or tree are just what we sense of them, for example, brown + hard + flat = chair. If no one perceives it, it isn’t there. Lastly, Social Constructivism argues that depending on the social context, objective truth is malleable. Cultures create a sense of objectivity that pertains to them. This leads to relativism. 

Thomistic responses 

Qua the Kantian school, their view misunderstands the nature of thought. From a Thomistic lens, intellection is always ad aliquid, meaning always toward something. An ‘empty thought’ isn’t a thought because the mind is not an empty box waiting to be filled by experience; it’s a tool meant to touch reality. The intellect doesn’t invent truth. It becomes active when it encounters something intelligible. It understands by receiving the form of what is, not inventing it. If we can understand things at all, the world is built to be understood. 

This is why actus essendi (the act of being) and intelligibility are linked. To exist is to be knowable. Our minds understand reality beyond mere ‘categories’. Thomism shows the human intellect is meant to directly understand reality as it truly is. Aquinas teaches reality is comprehensible because God, the source of all truth, created beings with a ‘nature’ we can understand. Our mind focuses on its nature, ignoring physical details, and understands the idea behind it. You know something is true when what’s in your mind matches reality adaequatio intellectus et rei. Truth isn’t created in our heads but when our mind correctly understands something that already exists. 

Secondly, viz phenomenalism, I respond that this confuses potency, the potential to be perceived, with act, actual existence. Something’s ability to be seen or touched is merely a potentia passiva (a passive potential). Potency is what something can be but isn’t yet; act is what something is now. Phenomenalism believes if something can be perceived it’s real, but just because it can be perceived doesn’t mean it exists that’s potential. Phenomenalism collapses because it reduces existence to appearances. The potential to be seen doesn’t mean existence. Imagine a chair in an empty room; it still exists in act, regardless if anyone sees it, because its existence isn’t dependent on our seeing it. Why? Because it has actus essendi (the act of existence). 

Lastly, relating to Social Constructivism, I respond that while society affects how we describe truth, it cannot change truth itself. Reality is rooted in a thing’s essence (what it really is), and no matter how hard we try, it cannot change based on opinions or norms. Saying truth is dependent on social agreements leads to relativism, the view that truth differs for everyone. If all truths are relative, then even the claim 'truth is an opinion' is also relative, making it potentially false. If truth is based on culture, morality isn’t stable. What’s ‘right’ in one society could be ‘evil’ in another, destroying all standards. Meaning slavery, torture, even murder would be fine simply because a society accepted them. But we know some things are truly wrong regardless of society. Adaequatio intellectus et rei means truth is the mind’s conformity to reality, not opinions. In De Veritate, Aquinas writes: “Truth resides in the intellect insofar as it conforms to reality, which is fixed and stable. Therefore, truth itself is unchanging.” 

Conclusion 

This thesis has argued that Thomistic realism offers the most philosophically coherent account of objectivity. It affirms that the human intellect can truly know reality as it is, because, as Thomists hold, being is inherently intelligible. The essay began by tracing the historical development of epistemological thought from Platonic realism to the Kantian turn and modern scepticism. It then outlined the Thomistic account of knowledge, focusing on the immateriality of the intellect, the process of abstraction, and the metaphysical foundation of intelligibility. Major objections from idealism, phenomenalism, and relativism were considered and answered, Ultimately, this affirms the validity of the thesis. 

Bibliography 

Aquinas, Thomas. De Ente et Essentia. 

Aquinas, Thomas. De Veritate. 

Baker, Alan Richard. The Philosophies of Mathematics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2021. 

Cottier, A. C., S.J. Logic and Epistemology. Translated by James B. Anderson. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2009. 

Feser, Edward. Philosophy of Mind. 2nd ed. South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2020.

Glenn, Paul J. Criteriology: A Class Manual in Major Logic. St. Louis, MO: B. Herder Book Co., 1940. 

Kemple, Brian. The Philosophy of Realism: A Journal for Philosophical Discourse. Vol. 1. Kearney, NE: The Lyceum, 2016. 

Mercier, Cardinal Désiré-Joseph. A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy. Translated by T. L. Parker and S. A. Tanquerey. St. Louis, MO: B. Herder Book Co., 1917. 

Pieper, Josef. Truth and Terror: Philosophical Reflections on the Work of Josef Pieper. Translated by Daniel O'Connor. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1987. 

Rioux, W. Thomas Aquinas’s Mathematical Realism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018. Coffey, Peter. Ontology: The Theory of Being. 

Moderate Realism (Aquinas 101) 

Thomistic Epistemology (Aquinas 101)